CVE-2026-106317
Overview
Changed Functions
| Function | Change | Notes |
|---|---|---|
ifchrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc |
modified |
Files Changed
chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
Patch
From af23e2707ce5e60362d214c762537d811101cb2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jingping Sun <jings@microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2026 07:29:13 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent fullscreen while Android HTTP auth prompts are active
Android HTTP authentication prompts can remain active while content
re-enters fullscreen, hiding browser origin UI during credential entry.
Drop content fullscreen before showing the prompt and retain the
WebContents security fullscreen blocker for the login handler lifetime.
Bug: 450323465
Change-Id: I7e6320cb59e2ca12ebcd335adf331a1e0a92f210
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/8361492
Reviewed-by: Andrew Grieve <agrieve@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jingping Sun <jings@microsoft.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1693773}
---
diff --git a/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc b/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
index 89736fc..53585d29 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/ui/android/login_handler_android.cc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <optional>
#include <string>
+#include "base/functional/callback_helpers.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
#include "chrome/browser/android/tab_android.h"
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
#include "net/base/auth.h"
#include "ui/android/view_android.h"
#include "ui/android/window_android.h"
+#include "ui/display/types/display_constants.h"
#include "url/gurl.h"
using content::BrowserThread;
@@ -56,6 +58,13 @@
ui::WindowAndroid* window = view ? view->GetWindowAndroid() : nullptr;
// Notify WindowAndroid that HTTP authentication is required.
if (tab && window) {
+ auto blocker = contents->ForSecurityDropFullscreen(
+ /*display_id=*/display::kInvalidDisplayId);
+ if (!blocker) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ fullscreen_blocker_ = std::move(*blocker);
+
chrome_http_auth_handler_ = std::make_unique<ChromeHttpAuthHandler>(
authority, explanation, auth_info().challenger.GetURL(),
login_model_data);
@@ -77,6 +86,7 @@
}
private:
+ base::ScopedClosureRunner fullscreen_blocker_;
std::unique_ptr<ChromeHttpAuthHandler> chrome_http_auth_handler_;
};
Original Bug Report
Fullscreen Basic Auth Prompt — Omnibox Spoofing / Credential Capture / DoS Chrome for Android
Steps to reproduce the problem
- On a physical Android device running Chrome version 141.0.7390.43, visit:
https://thewhiteevil.onrender.com/trap/full-screen-auth-prompt/. - Click the page button to enter fullscreen with an authentication prompt.
- Press the Android back button multiple times — you remain in fullscreen with the auth prompt.
- Submit random credentials — the fullscreen/auth prompt persists and the user cannot escape.
Problem Description
- Entering fullscreen while showing the HTTP Basic Auth prompt allows omnibox/origin spoofing, persistent auth prompts and a denial-of-service-like condition on Chrome for Android version 141.0.7390.43.
Impact:
- UI/Origin spoofing (users may be misled about which origin is requesting credentials).
- Credential capture risk if users enter credentials into a spoofed prompt.
- Denial of service / usability failure — users cannot escape the prompt or fullscreen.
Remediation:
- Chrome should not enter fullscreen while presenting an authentication prompt, or should bind the visible origin and chrome UI to the authentic requesting origin and prevent fullscreen-based spoofing.
- Ensure the auth prompt is dismissible and that normal navigation (back button) reliably exits fullscreen and prompt state.
- Consider a user-gesture requirement or blocking fullscreen transitions while privileged modal dialogs (like HTTP auth) are active.
Additional Comments
Exploit source link: https://github.com/Trikolon/evil-traps/tree/master/src/traps/fullscreen-basic-auth
Summary
Fullscreen Basic Auth Prompt — Omnibox Spoofing / Credential Capture / DoS Chrome for Android
Custom Questions
Reporter credit:
Manojkumar Jaganathan (https://www.linkedin.com/in/manojkumar-j-7ba35b202/) Aka TheWhiteEvil (https://hackerone.com/the-white-evil) with HackerBro Technologies
Additional Data
Category: Security
Chrome Channel: Stable
Regression: N/A \