Chrome · FullScreen
CVE-2026-113214
Input Validation in FullScreen
Overview
Low
Severity
—
CVSS
No
Exploited ITW
Fixed
Fix Status
Changed Functions
| Function | Change | Notes |
|---|---|---|
ifchrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller.cc |
modified |
Files Changed
chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller.ccchrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc
Patch
From 8c0e7738e64fc12dd1869b11a0e7d21bc6b5c70c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vikram Pasupathy <vpasupathy@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2026 11:38:50 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Require user activation for Pointer Lock while in tab fullscreen
PointerLockController::RequestToLockPointer() previously skipped the
user-activation and post-Esc cooldown checks whenever the tab was in
HTML fullscreen.
Because WebContents::IsFullscreen() is tab-scoped, this exemption
applied to every frame in the tab regardless of which frame obtained the
user activation to enter fullscreen, allowing an embedded cross-origin
iframe to silently lock the pointer without a user gesture.
Drop the tab-fullscreen exemption so that a pointer-lock request must
carry its own transient user activation (or come from a target that
previously unlocked itself), and so that the post-Esc cooldown is
honored even while the tab is fullscreen.
Bug: 506148052
Change-Id: I58166868cae38274c5151a3590ddecf3acd77af8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/8422256
Reviewed-by: Frank Liberato <liberato@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Vikram Pasupathy <vpasupathy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1704993}
---
diff --git a/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller.cc b/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller.cc
index 4d2687f..eebf155 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller.cc
@@ -50,12 +50,11 @@
DCHECK(!IsPointerLocked());
// To prevent misbehaving sites from constantly re-locking the pointer, the
- // lock-requesting page must have transient user activation and it must not
+ // lock-requesting frame must have transient user activation and it must not
// request for a lock within |kEffectiveUserEscapeDuration| time since the
- // user successfully escaped from a previous lock. Exceptions are when the
- // page has unlocked (i.e. not the user), or if we're in tab fullscreen (which
- // requires its own transient user activation).
- if (!last_unlocked_by_target && !web_contents->IsFullscreen()) {
+ // user successfully escaped from a previous lock. The only exception is when
+ // the target frame previously unlocked itself (i.e. not the user).
+ if (!last_unlocked_by_target) {
if (!user_gesture) {
web_contents->GotResponseToPointerLockRequest(
blink::mojom::PointerLockResult::kRequiresUserGesture);
diff --git a/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc b/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc
index 83b82f9..44bc85d 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc
@@ -187,3 +187,36 @@
->pointer_lock_controller()
->IsPointerLocked());
}
+
+IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(PointerLockControllerTest,
+ PointerLockInFullscreenRequiresUserGesture) {
+ EnterActiveTabFullscreen();
+
+ // A pointer lock request without user gesture must be rejected even while
+ // in tab fullscreen (crbug.com/506148052).
+ RequestToLockPointer(/*user_gesture=*/false,
+ /*last_unlocked_by_target=*/false);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+
+ // With a user gesture, pointer lock is granted.
+ RequestToLockPointer(/*user_gesture=*/true,
+ /*last_unlocked_by_target=*/false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+
+ // An immediate re-lock attempt within the post-escape cooldown period
+ // must be rejected even with a user gesture while in fullscreen.
+ SendEscapeToExclusiveAccessManager();
+ EXPECT_FALSE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+
+ RequestToLockPointer(/*user_gesture=*/true,
+ /*last_unlocked_by_target=*/false);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+}
Loading diff…
Regression Test / PoC
shipped with the fix
diff --git a/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc b/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc
index 83b82f9..44bc85d 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/ui/exclusive_access/pointer_lock_controller_browsertest.cc
@@ -187,3 +187,36 @@
->pointer_lock_controller()
->IsPointerLocked());
}
+
+IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(PointerLockControllerTest,
+ PointerLockInFullscreenRequiresUserGesture) {
+ EnterActiveTabFullscreen();
+
+ // A pointer lock request without user gesture must be rejected even while
+ // in tab fullscreen (crbug.com/506148052).
+ RequestToLockPointer(/*user_gesture=*/false,
+ /*last_unlocked_by_target=*/false);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+
+ // With a user gesture, pointer lock is granted.
+ RequestToLockPointer(/*user_gesture=*/true,
+ /*last_unlocked_by_target=*/false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+
+ // An immediate re-lock attempt within the post-escape cooldown period
+ // must be rejected even with a user gesture while in fullscreen.
+ SendEscapeToExclusiveAccessManager();
+ EXPECT_FALSE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+
+ RequestToLockPointer(/*user_gesture=*/true,
+ /*last_unlocked_by_target=*/false);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(GetExclusiveAccessManager()
+ ->pointer_lock_controller()
+ ->IsPointerLocked());
+}
Loading diff…
Original Bug Report
The reporter's bug is still restricted on the tracker. Chrome de-restricts security bugs ~30–90 days after the fix ships; a later run will backfill it here.
References
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