Chrome · Loader
CVE-2026-113294
Input Validation in Loader
Overview
Low
Severity
—
CVSS
No
Exploited ITW
Fixed
Fix Status
Files Changed
content/SECURITY.md
Patch
From d39f86845d948a4830a9809cf7b84f43e9193641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Victor Tan <victortan@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 07:49:09 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Document Client Hints persistence and delegation in content/SECURITY.md
Clarify in content/SECURITY.md that Client Hints (Accept-CH and
Critical-CH) and their persistence are a content-negotiation and
privacy mechanism rather than a process-isolated security boundary.
Also document that Client Hints intentionally propagate main-frame
context and permissions policies to subframes, subresources, and
preloads, so edge cases in Accept-CH persistence or inheritance should
be treated as functional bugs rather than security vulnerabilities.
Bug: 563016452, 563015686, 563015337
Change-Id: I22a8ca6abf715b2d4787bafe3ff97f338287dc8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/8423367
Reviewed-by: Ari Chivukula <arichiv@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Tan <victortan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1703424}
---
diff --git a/content/SECURITY.md b/content/SECURITY.md
index 7d52b65..f561ae9 100644
--- a/content/SECURITY.md
+++ b/content/SECURITY.md
@@ -165,6 +165,19 @@
access to unpartitioned storage and third-party cookies via JavaScript, but
network requests from the document (or workers) must reflect the revoked
permission.
+* **Client Hints (`Accept-CH` / `Critical-CH`):** Client Hints and their
+ persistence (`ContentSettingsType::CLIENT_HINTS`) are a content-negotiation
+ and privacy mechanism, not a process-isolated security boundary. High-entropy
+ client hints expose device and user-agent properties that are already
+ accessible to active scripts via JavaScript APIs (e.g.,
+ `navigator.userAgentData.getHighEntropyValues()`), and any site can already
+ trigger `Accept-CH` persistence for a third-party origin via a top-level
+ redirect. Additionally, Client Hints intentionally propagate main-frame
+ context and policies (`main_frame_origin`, `is_outermost_main_frame`, and
+ `PermissionsPolicy`) to subframes, subresources, preloads, and network-service
+ interceptors. Issues where preloading, prefetching, or subresource fetches
+ persist or inherit `Accept-CH` state should be filed as functional bugs rather
+ than security vulnerabilities.
## Mitigating Factors
Loading diff…
Original Bug Report
The reporter's bug is still restricted on the tracker. Chrome de-restricts security bugs ~30–90 days after the fix ships; a later run will backfill it here.
References
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