CVE-2026-17976

Low chrome Logic Error 🔧 Commit mapped

Overview

Low

Severity

—

CVSS

Exploited ITW

Fixed

Fix Status

ImpactPolicy bypass in Extensions

DescriptionPolicy bypass in Extensions

ComponentExtensions

Bug ClassLogic Error

Tracker519455164

Fix commitb2d2df8dfd69 (chromium/src) +19/-10

CISA KEVNot listed

CreditedGoogle

Disclosed2026-07-29

Changed Functions

Function	Change	Notes
`TEST` extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc	modified

Files Changed

chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc
extensions/common/url_pattern.cc
extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc

Patch

view commit

From b2d2df8dfd694f0b45ca00a6f493da35ca8831d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eva Su <evasu@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 13:03:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] [Extensions] Fix ExtensionSettings bypass with multiple trailing dots

The `CanonicalizeHostForMatching` function in
`extensions/common/url_pattern.cc` previously only removed a single
trailing dot from hostnames. This allowed a bypass of the
`runtime_blocked_hosts` policy in ExtensionSettings if a URL contained
multiple trailing dots.

This change updates the function to remove all trailing dots from the
hostname before matching against the policy. This prevents the bypass
and correctly enforces the intended host restrictions.

Fixed: 519455164
Change-Id: I5fbc7a891079e89293a15e008fe6a2c02ecf0e59
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/7907778
Reviewed-by: Tim <tjudkins@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eva Su <evasu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1646199}
---

diff --git a/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc b/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc
index 884857bb..0963a5c 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc
@@ -200,8 +200,15 @@
     {"http://localhost/", "localhost"},
 
     // Sanity check empty domain parts.
+    // URLPattern trims all trailing dots from hosts for matching (both from the
+    // pattern and from the evaluated host). Thus, patterns or hosts with any
+    // number of trailing dots are canonicalized to the version without trailing
+    // dots and match.
     {"https://google.com./", "google.com"},
     {"https://google.com./", "google.com."},
+    {"https://google.com/", "google.com."},
+    {"https://google.com/", "google.com.."},
+    {"https://google.com../", "google.com"},
 };
 
 constexpr PatternRpIdPair kInvalidRelyingPartyTestCases[] = {
@@ -240,12 +247,7 @@
     {"https://not-google.com/", "google.com)"},
     {"https://evil.appspot.com/", "appspot.com"},
     {"https://evil.co.uk/", "co.uk"},
-    // TODO(nsatragno): URLPattern erroneously trims trailing dots. Fix
-    // CanonicalizeHostForMatching and uncomment this line.
-    // {"https://google.com/", "google.com."},
-    {"https://google.com/", "google.com.."},
     {"https://google.com/", ".google.com"},
-    {"https://google.com../", "google.com"},
     {"https://.com/", "com."},
     {"https://.co.uk/", "co.uk."},
     {"https://1.2.3/", "1.2.3"},
diff --git a/extensions/common/url_pattern.cc b/extensions/common/url_pattern.cc
index c87bf37..1f733c42 100644
--- a/extensions/common/url_pattern.cc
+++ b/extensions/common/url_pattern.cc
@@ -123,12 +123,9 @@
   return path;
 }
 
-// Removes trailing dot from |host_piece| if any.
+// Removes trailing dot(s) from |host_piece| if any.
 std::string_view CanonicalizeHostForMatching(std::string_view host_piece) {
-  if (base::EndsWith(host_piece, ".")) {
-    host_piece.remove_suffix(1);
-  }
-  return host_piece;
+  return base::TrimString(host_piece, ".", base::TRIM_TRAILING);
 }
 
 }  // namespace
diff --git a/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc b/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc
index bb74cd70..dd9deee 100644
--- a/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc
+++ b/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc
@@ -967,6 +967,7 @@
 TEST(ExtensionURLPatternTest, TrailingDotDomain) {
   const GURL normal_domain("http://example.com/");
   const GURL trailing_dot_domain("http://example.com./");
+  const GURL multiple_trailing_dots_domain("http://example.com../");
 
   // Both patterns should match trailing dot and non trailing dot domains. More
   // information about this not obvious behaviour can be found in [1].
@@ -986,11 +987,20 @@
   const URLPattern pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_HTTP, "*://example.com/*");
   EXPECT_TRUE(pattern.MatchesURL(normal_domain));
   EXPECT_TRUE(pattern.MatchesURL(trailing_dot_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(pattern.MatchesURL(multiple_trailing_dots_domain));
 
   const URLPattern trailing_pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_HTTP,
                                     "*://example.com./*");
   EXPECT_TRUE(trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(normal_domain));
   EXPECT_TRUE(trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(trailing_dot_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(multiple_trailing_dots_domain));
+
+  const URLPattern multiple_trailing_pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_HTTP,
+                                             "*://example.com../*");
+  EXPECT_TRUE(multiple_trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(normal_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(multiple_trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(trailing_dot_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(
+      multiple_trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(multiple_trailing_dots_domain));
 }
 
 TEST(ExtensionURLPatternTest, MatchesEffectiveTLD) {

Loading diff…

Regression Test / PoC

shipped with the fix

diff --git a/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc b/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc
index 884857bb..0963a5c 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/webauthn/chrome_web_authentication_delegate_unittest.cc
@@ -200,8 +200,15 @@
     {"http://localhost/", "localhost"},
 
     // Sanity check empty domain parts.
+    // URLPattern trims all trailing dots from hosts for matching (both from the
+    // pattern and from the evaluated host). Thus, patterns or hosts with any
+    // number of trailing dots are canonicalized to the version without trailing
+    // dots and match.
     {"https://google.com./", "google.com"},
     {"https://google.com./", "google.com."},
+    {"https://google.com/", "google.com."},
+    {"https://google.com/", "google.com.."},
+    {"https://google.com../", "google.com"},
 };
 
 constexpr PatternRpIdPair kInvalidRelyingPartyTestCases[] = {
@@ -240,12 +247,7 @@
     {"https://not-google.com/", "google.com)"},
     {"https://evil.appspot.com/", "appspot.com"},
     {"https://evil.co.uk/", "co.uk"},
-    // TODO(nsatragno): URLPattern erroneously trims trailing dots. Fix
-    // CanonicalizeHostForMatching and uncomment this line.
-    // {"https://google.com/", "google.com."},
-    {"https://google.com/", "google.com.."},
     {"https://google.com/", ".google.com"},
-    {"https://google.com../", "google.com"},
     {"https://.com/", "com."},
     {"https://.co.uk/", "co.uk."},
     {"https://1.2.3/", "1.2.3"},
diff --git a/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc b/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc
index bb74cd70..dd9deee 100644
--- a/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc
+++ b/extensions/common/url_pattern_unittest.cc
@@ -967,6 +967,7 @@
 TEST(ExtensionURLPatternTest, TrailingDotDomain) {
   const GURL normal_domain("http://example.com/");
   const GURL trailing_dot_domain("http://example.com./");
+  const GURL multiple_trailing_dots_domain("http://example.com../");
 
   // Both patterns should match trailing dot and non trailing dot domains. More
   // information about this not obvious behaviour can be found in [1].
@@ -986,11 +987,20 @@
   const URLPattern pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_HTTP, "*://example.com/*");
   EXPECT_TRUE(pattern.MatchesURL(normal_domain));
   EXPECT_TRUE(pattern.MatchesURL(trailing_dot_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(pattern.MatchesURL(multiple_trailing_dots_domain));
 
   const URLPattern trailing_pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_HTTP,
                                     "*://example.com./*");
   EXPECT_TRUE(trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(normal_domain));
   EXPECT_TRUE(trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(trailing_dot_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(multiple_trailing_dots_domain));
+
+  const URLPattern multiple_trailing_pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_HTTP,
+                                             "*://example.com../*");
+  EXPECT_TRUE(multiple_trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(normal_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(multiple_trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(trailing_dot_domain));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(
+      multiple_trailing_pattern.MatchesURL(multiple_trailing_dots_domain));
 }
 
 TEST(ExtensionURLPatternTest, MatchesEffectiveTLD) {

Loading diff…

Original Bug Report

The reporter's bug is still restricted on the tracker. Chrome de-restricts security bugs ~30–90 days after the fix ships; a later run will backfill it here.

References

Vendor advisory Fix commit Bug tracker NVD

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