PatchGap
Chrome · FileSystem › FSA

CVE-2026-76025

Policy Bypass in FileSystem (FSA)
High chrome Policy Bypass 🔧 Commit mapped

Overview

High
Severity
—
CVSS
No
Exploited ITW
Fixed
Fix Status
ImpactUse after free in FileSystem
DescriptionUse after free in FileSystem
ComponentFileSystem
Sub-componentFSA
Bug ClassPolicy Bypass
Tracker559780982
Fix commitd6f2c70dbb4c (chromium/src) +161/-8
CISA KEVNot listed
CreditedGoogle
Disclosed2026-10-29

Background

File System Access API (FSA)
Lets a web origin, after a user picker grant, read and write files/directories on the host. To prevent abuse, Chrome maintains a sensitive-path blocklist consulted by ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess.
`ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContext` blocklist
A static table of BlockPath entries in chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context.cc. Each entry blocks a path by absolute location, by a directory relative to a PathService key (e.g. base::DIR_HOME), or by a path suffix.
`BlockType`
kBlockAllChildren blocks both read and write to a path and everything under it; kBlockWrite blocks only writes (reads stay allowed). CreateSuffix matches any path ending in the given suffix (case-insensitively, per the test’s .GIT/CONFIG case).
`AccessTrigger`
Distinguishes kOpen/kProgrammaticRead (reads) from kSave/kProgrammaticWrite (writes), so kBlockWrite entries can gate writes while permitting reads.

Root Cause Analysis

This is a policy/blocklist gap (missing sensitive paths), not a use-after-free — the advisory’s “Use after free in FileSystem” is not substantiated by the diff, which only adds static BlockPath entries and a unit test. The root cause is that several security-sensitive locations were reachable via FSA because they were absent from the blocklist or only blocked on some platforms, so a granted origin could write to (or read) them and achieve persistence or code execution. The patch closes these holes:

  • */.git/config and */.git/modules are now CreateSuffix(..., kBlockWrite) on all platforms, alongside the pre-existing */.git/hooks. Writing .git/config (e.g. core.fsmonitor/core.pager/core.sshCommand) or planting hooks/config inside submodule git dirs under .git/modules yields command execution when the user next runs git. Reads stay allowed so web git clients keep working.
  • ~/.config is promoted from Linux/ChromeOS/Android-only to all platforms (kBlockAllChildren), since it holds config for many cross-platform tools.
  • Shell startup files in the home dir (.bash_profile, .bash_login, .bashrc, .profile, .zshenv, .zprofile, .zshrc, .zlogin) are blocked on all platforms (including those Git Bash reads on Windows) — writing any of them gives shell code execution at next login/shell start.
  • /dev is now blocked on macOS (kBlockAllChildren), matching Linux.
  • On Linux/ChromeOS: ~/.local/share, legacy fontconfig ~/.fonts.conf / ~/.fonts.conf.d, and the NSS database dir ~/.pki are blocked (the old single ~/.config Linux entry is removed since ~/.config is now blocked globally above).

The companion unit test ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess_GitConfigAndModulesWriteBlock pins the intended semantics: .git/config and everything under .git/modules abort for kSave/kProgrammaticWrite (including the case-variant .GIT/CONFIG) but are allowed for kOpen/kProgrammaticRead; sibling files like config.bak and a config outside .git remain allowed; and the .git directory itself is still savable. The _ExplicitPathBlock test is extended to assert /dev is blocked on macOS, and the path-enumeration test adds the new home-dir entries.

Key insight
The FSA sensitive-path blocklist was missing (or only partially platform-scoped) entries for files whose write grants code execution or persistence — .git/config, .git/modules, shell rc/profile files, ~/.config, ~/.pki, /dev on macOS — so a granted web origin could write them and bypass the intended protection.

Attack Path

  1. Obtain a grant Attacker site convinces the user to grant FSA access to a directory that contains (or is an ancestor of) a sensitive target — e.g. a checked-out git repository, or the home directory. (user-interaction gated; social-engineering step inferred)
  2. Locate the gap Navigate to a path missing from the old blocklist: <repo>/.git/config, a file under <repo>/.git/modules/<sub>, or a home-dir shell startup file / ~/.config entry (platform-dependent pre-patch).
  3. Write a payload Write a malicious git config (core.pager, core.sshCommand, core.fsmonitor, submodule hooks) or append to .bashrc/.zshrc/.bash_profile.
  4. Trigger execution The user later runs git in the repo, opens a shell, or logs in, executing the attacker’s content.
  5. Primitive Arbitrary command/code execution in the user’s context (or disclosure/tampering of NSS keys, fontconfig, /dev), i.e. a sandbox/policy bypass escalating a file grant into host code execution.

Impact Assessment

Browser-side permission check; the attacker is untrusted web content that has obtained an FSA grant (requires a user picker interaction, the main gating precondition). The gained capability is write access to sensitive files the blocklist was meant to forbid, which in practice escalates to code execution/persistence (git config/hooks, shell startup files) or sensitive-data access (~/.pki NSS DB) — a serious policy bypass, but not memory corruption and not a UAF despite the advisory label. Strength depends on the granted root and the victim later invoking git/a shell. Per the withhold guidance: the diff does substantiate a security root cause (a concrete blocklist bypass), so this is a solid write-up, with the class corrected from the advisory’s “UAF” to a policy bypass.

Files Changed

  • chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc
  • chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context.cc

Audit Directions

  • Cross-platform parity of the blocklist
    Audit every BlockPath entry still guarded by a single-platform #if for locations that are sensitive on other platforms too (the ~/.config and /dev gaps were exactly this).
  • Write-to-execute files
    Enumerate files whose write yields execution/persistence (VCS configs/hooks, shell rc/profile, autostart, LD/DYLD config, .gitconfig, .npmrc, CI configs) and confirm each is suffix/relative-blocked for write.
  • Suffix-match robustness
    Verify CreateSuffix matching handles case, separators, and trailing components so .git/config variants cannot evade (the test covers .GIT/CONFIG; check deeper nesting and symlinks).
  • Read-allowed sensitive dirs
    For kBlockWrite-only entries (reads allowed), confirm no read-only leak of secrets (e.g. ensure .git/config read exposure is acceptable vs ~/.pki which is kBlockAllChildren).

Patch

view commit
From d6f2c70dbb4cd97f6eaf62aed88c8f2e57ef3fce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mingyu Lei <leimy@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:00:11 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] FSA: Add missing sensitive paths to the blocklist

Several sensitive locations are still reachable through File System
Access because they are missing from the sensitive-path blocklist, or
are only blocked on some platforms. Add them:

- Block write access to */.git/config and */.git/modules on all
  platforms, alongside */.git/hooks. Reads stay allowed, so web Git
  clients can still read repository configuration.
- Block ~/.config on all platforms. It was only blocked on Linux,
  ChromeOS and Android.
- Block shell startup files in the home directory on all platforms,
  including the ones Git Bash reads on Windows.
- Block /dev on macOS, matching Linux.
- Block ~/.local/share, the legacy fontconfig files ~/.fonts.conf and
  ~/.fonts.conf.d, and the NSS database directory ~/.pki on Linux and
  ChromeOS.

Bug: 572269631, 571913154, 569012015, 558362029
Bug: 569012543, 561996724, 559780982, 557367241
Test: unit_tests --gtest_filter=ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContextTest.*ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess*
Change-Id: Ia6fe9e51807e8106fbc6ac69e28d550660e49b38
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/8619619
Reviewed-by: Fergal Daly <fergal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mingyu Lei <leimy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1724465}
---
diff --git a/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context.cc b/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context.cc
index 112be22..be365904 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context.cc
@@ -441,10 +441,41 @@
       // And limit access to ~/.gnupg as well.
       BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".gnupg"),
                                 BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      // ~/.config holds configuration for many cross-platform tools, so block
+      // it on all platforms, see crbug.com/569012015.
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".config"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      // Shell startup files in the home directory, including the ones read by
+      // Git Bash on Windows, see crbug.com/558362029.
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME,
+                                FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bash_profile"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME,
+                                FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bash_login"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bashrc"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".profile"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zshenv"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zprofile"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zshrc"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zlogin"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
       // Block write access to */.git/hooks, see crbug.com/465668234 and
       // crbug.com/553115714.
       BlockPath::CreateSuffix(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".git/hooks"),
                               BlockType::kBlockWrite),
+      // Block write access to the repository config and to submodule git
+      // directories, which have their own hooks and config, see
+      // crbug.com/572269631 and crbug.com/571913154.
+      BlockPath::CreateSuffix(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".git/config"),
+                              BlockType::kBlockWrite),
+      BlockPath::CreateSuffix(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".git/modules"),
+                              BlockType::kBlockWrite),
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
       // Some Windows specific directories to block, basically all apps, the
       // operating system itself, as well as configuration data for apps.
@@ -475,6 +506,10 @@
       // volumes).
       BlockPath::CreateAbsolute(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/System/Volumes"),
                                 BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      // Block access to devices via /dev, matching Linux, see
+      // crbug.com/569012543.
+      BlockPath::CreateAbsolute(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/dev"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
       BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_APP_DATA,
                                 BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
       // Block access to the current bundle directory.
@@ -525,14 +560,25 @@
                                 BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
       BlockPath::CreateAbsolute(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/etc"),
                                 BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
-      // And block all of ~/.config, matching the similar restrictions on mac
-      // and windows.
-      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".config"),
-                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
       // Block ~/.dbus as well, just in case, although there probably isn't much
       // a website can do with access to that directory and its contents.
       BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".dbus"),
                                 BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      // Block per-user application data, see crbug.com/561996724.
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME,
+                                FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".local/share"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      // Block the legacy per-user fontconfig configuration, see
+      // crbug.com/559780982. The current location is under ~/.config.
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME,
+                                FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".fonts.conf"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME,
+                                FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".fonts.conf.d"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
+      // Block the per-user NSS database, see crbug.com/557367241.
+      BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".pki"),
+                                BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
       // And block all of ~/.cache, matching the similar restrictions on mac
       // and windows.
       BlockPath::CreateRelative(base::DIR_CACHE, BlockType::kBlockAllChildren),
diff --git a/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc b/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc
index 1bd9323..d500135 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc
@@ -862,9 +862,8 @@
 
 TEST_F(ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContextTest,
        ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess_ExplicitPathBlock) {
-// Linux is the only OS where we have some blocked directories with explicit
-// paths (as opposed to PathService provided paths).
-#if BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
+#if BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID) || \
+    BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
   // /dev should be blocked.
   EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
                 permission_context(), PathInfo(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/dev")),
@@ -1604,6 +1603,101 @@
             SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
 }
 
+// Testing that writes to */.git/config and */.git/modules are blocked, while
+// reads stay allowed.
+TEST_F(ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContextTest,
+       ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess_GitConfigAndModulesWriteBlock) {
+#if defined(FILE_PATH_USES_DRIVE_LETTERS)
+  base::FilePath root(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("c:\\"));
+#else
+  base::FilePath root(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/"));
+#endif
+  const base::FilePath git_dir =
+      root.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("a")).Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".git"));
+  const base::FilePath git_config = git_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"));
+  const base::FilePath git_modules =
+      git_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("modules"));
+  const base::FilePath submodule_dir =
+      git_modules.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("sub"));
+
+  // .git/config is blocked for save and programmatic write.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kSave),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  // .git/config is not blocked for read.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kOpen),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticRead),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  // Case variations of .git/config are blocked for programmatic write.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(root.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("a"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".GIT"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("CONFIG"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  // Other files under .git, and files named config outside of .git, are
+  // allowed.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(git_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config.bak"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(root.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("a"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+
+  // .git/modules and everything inside it is blocked for save and programmatic
+  // write.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_modules),
+                HandleType::kDirectory, AccessTrigger::kSave),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_modules),
+                HandleType::kDirectory, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(submodule_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("hooks"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("pre-commit"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(submodule_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  // .git/modules is not blocked for read.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_modules),
+                HandleType::kDirectory, AccessTrigger::kOpen),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(submodule_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticRead),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  // The .git directory itself is still allowed for save.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_dir), HandleType::kDirectory,
+                AccessTrigger::kSave),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+}
+
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
 TEST_F(ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContextTest,
        ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess_ContentUri) {
@@ -1867,6 +1961,15 @@
       {chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, nullptr, true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".ssh"), true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".gnupg"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".config"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bash_profile"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bash_login"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bashrc"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".profile"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zshenv"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zprofile"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zshrc"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zlogin"), true, false},
 
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
       {base::DIR_PROGRAM_FILES, nullptr, true, false},
@@ -1880,6 +1983,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
+      {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/dev"), true, false},
       {base::DIR_APP_DATA, nullptr, true, false},
       {chrome::DIR_OUTER_BUNDLE, nullptr, true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("Applications"), true, false},
@@ -1900,8 +2004,11 @@
       {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/sys"), true, false},
       {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/boot"), true, false},
       {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/etc"), true, false},
-      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".config"), true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".dbus"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".local/share"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".fonts.conf"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".fonts.conf.d"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".pki"), true, false},
 #endif
 
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
Loading diff…

Regression Test / PoC

shipped with the fix
diff --git a/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc b/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc
index 1bd9323..d500135 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/file_system_access/chrome_file_system_access_permission_context_unittest.cc
@@ -862,9 +862,8 @@
 
 TEST_F(ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContextTest,
        ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess_ExplicitPathBlock) {
-// Linux is the only OS where we have some blocked directories with explicit
-// paths (as opposed to PathService provided paths).
-#if BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
+#if BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID) || \
+    BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
   // /dev should be blocked.
   EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
                 permission_context(), PathInfo(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/dev")),
@@ -1604,6 +1603,101 @@
             SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
 }
 
+// Testing that writes to */.git/config and */.git/modules are blocked, while
+// reads stay allowed.
+TEST_F(ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContextTest,
+       ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess_GitConfigAndModulesWriteBlock) {
+#if defined(FILE_PATH_USES_DRIVE_LETTERS)
+  base::FilePath root(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("c:\\"));
+#else
+  base::FilePath root(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/"));
+#endif
+  const base::FilePath git_dir =
+      root.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("a")).Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".git"));
+  const base::FilePath git_config = git_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"));
+  const base::FilePath git_modules =
+      git_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("modules"));
+  const base::FilePath submodule_dir =
+      git_modules.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("sub"));
+
+  // .git/config is blocked for save and programmatic write.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kSave),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  // .git/config is not blocked for read.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kOpen),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_config), HandleType::kFile,
+                AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticRead),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  // Case variations of .git/config are blocked for programmatic write.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(root.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("a"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".GIT"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("CONFIG"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  // Other files under .git, and files named config outside of .git, are
+  // allowed.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(git_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config.bak"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(root.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("a"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+
+  // .git/modules and everything inside it is blocked for save and programmatic
+  // write.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_modules),
+                HandleType::kDirectory, AccessTrigger::kSave),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_modules),
+                HandleType::kDirectory, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(submodule_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("hooks"))
+                             .Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("pre-commit"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(submodule_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticWrite),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAbort);
+  // .git/modules is not blocked for read.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_modules),
+                HandleType::kDirectory, AccessTrigger::kOpen),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(),
+                PathInfo(submodule_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("config"))),
+                HandleType::kFile, AccessTrigger::kProgrammaticRead),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+  // The .git directory itself is still allowed for save.
+  EXPECT_EQ(ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccessSync(
+                permission_context(), PathInfo(git_dir), HandleType::kDirectory,
+                AccessTrigger::kSave),
+            SensitiveDirectoryResult::kAllowed);
+}
+
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
 TEST_F(ChromeFileSystemAccessPermissionContextTest,
        ConfirmSensitiveEntryAccess_ContentUri) {
@@ -1867,6 +1961,15 @@
       {chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, nullptr, true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".ssh"), true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".gnupg"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".config"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bash_profile"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bash_login"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".bashrc"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".profile"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zshenv"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zprofile"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zshrc"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zlogin"), true, false},
 
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
       {base::DIR_PROGRAM_FILES, nullptr, true, false},
@@ -1880,6 +1983,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
+      {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/dev"), true, false},
       {base::DIR_APP_DATA, nullptr, true, false},
       {chrome::DIR_OUTER_BUNDLE, nullptr, true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("Applications"), true, false},
@@ -1900,8 +2004,11 @@
       {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/sys"), true, false},
       {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/boot"), true, false},
       {kNoBasePathKey, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/etc"), true, false},
-      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".config"), true, false},
       {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".dbus"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".local/share"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".fonts.conf"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".fonts.conf.d"), true, false},
+      {base::DIR_HOME, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".pki"), true, false},
 #endif
 
 #if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
Loading diff…

Original Bug Report

The reporter's bug is still restricted on the tracker. Chrome de-restricts security bugs ~30–90 days after the fix ships; a later run will backfill it here.
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